Mohammad Hossein SHAMKHANI

Dominica; Iran

1984-04-19

Tehran, Iran

Male

United Arab Emirates

70293384, Identification Number; T97659579, Passport; R0191309, Passport

Business

Today, in its largest Iran-related action since 2018, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating more than 50 individuals and entities and identifying more than 50 vessels that are part of the vast shipping empire controlled by Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani (Hossein). Hossein—the son of Ali Shamkhani, a top political advisor to the Supreme Leader of Iran—leverages corruption through his father’s political influence at the highest levels of the Iranian regime to build and operate a massive fleet of tankers and containerships. This network transports oil and petroleum products from Iran and Russia, as well as other cargo, to buyers around the world, generating tens of billions of dollars in profit. Hossein’s network exerts control over a significant portion of Iran’s crude oil exports, the proceeds of which substantially benefit his family and the Iranian regime. Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani’s (Hossein) network comprises a vast fleet of vessels, ship management firms, and front companies—some posing as legitimate financial services firms—that launder billions in profits from global sales of Iranian and Russian crude oil and other petroleum products, most often to buyers in China. The network employs significant measures to disguise its operations and obfuscate its ties to the Shamkhani family, Iran, and Russia. Hossein solely uses aliases when conducting network business which include “H,” “Hector,” and “Hugo Hayek,” the false name listed on his Dominica passport. The network’s fleet, which consists of both oil tankers and containerships, undergoes frequent changes in the operators and managers of each vessel to ensure that determining the ultimate responsibility for any particular vessel remains opaque and difficult to trace back to the Shamkhani family. The fleet at times has been given preferential treatment over other vessels when loading or unloading in Iranian ports. Hossein is intimately involved in the management of the network’s illicit activities through various companies, including United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based Marvise SMC DMCC (Marvise), formerly known as Mairin Ship Management and Consultancy DMCC, which provides management services to many of Hossein’s shipping firms and secretly controls a fleet of dozens of vessels that publicly appear to be owned by multiple other companies transporting crude oil and liquified petroleum gas for Iran. Hossein personally oversees Marvise’s operations in Tehran, Iran. Historically, much of Hossein’s tanker fleet fell under the purview of UAE-based Armada Global Shipping DMCC (Armada Global), an umbrella company that managed dozens of vessels used by the network until as recently as early 2025. UAE-based firms Koban Shipping L.L.C, Crios Shipping L.L.C (Crios Shipping), and Fractal Marine DMCC have also played important roles in the management and operation of the network’s fleet of tankers and containerships. In 2024, Hossein’s network, including Crios Shipping, was publicly exposed for its involvement in shipping missiles, drone components, and dual-use goods from Iran to Russia in exchange for shipments of Russian petroleum. Hossein’s companies subsequently sold to overseas buyers, with the proceeds of the sales benefiting Hossein’s network. Crios Shipping and other companies in Hossein’s network incorporate special purpose vehicles in offshore jurisdictions, such as Marshall Islands-registered Oka Shipping Inc., for the sole purpose of managing vessels on their behalf, insulating the rest of the network from legal risk. Crios Shipping is also closely related to Oceanlink Maritime DMCC (Oceanlink), a UAE-based entity in Hossein’s network that was designated on April 4, 2024 for its role facilitating shipments on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) affiliate Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (Sepehr Energy). OFAC designated Sepehr Energy on November 29, 2023, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of MODAFL. Although the primary income source for Hossein’s network is oil sales, the network also operates a containership fleet that carries cargo both to and from Iran, among other locations. In an attempt to evade prohibitions on the sale of certain non-humanitarian goods to Iran, Hossein’s network offers certain overseas sellers Iranian oil in lieu of payment. The network’s containerships have utilized obfuscation tactics similar to those used by tankers carrying Iranian oil. For example, the Liberia-flagged BIGLI (IMO 9307047) loaded Iranian petrochemicals that were then discharged in China, with bills of lading showing signs of possible modification, which is a red flag for Iranian sanctions violations. The Saint Vincent and the Grenadines-flagged ACE (IMO 9228538) similarly loaded a shipment of goods in Iran, turning off its automatic identification system (AIS) transponder during loading, and misrepresented cargo information in bills of lading. UAE-based Reel Shipping L.L.C (Reel Shipping) manages a fleet of seven containerships on behalf of Hossein’s network (see the Annex for Reel Shipping’s blocked vessels), some of which count other Hossein-affiliated sanctioned entities among their historical management. Singapore-based Draco Buren Shipping PTE. Ltd. (Draco Buren) is one of the myriad shipping companies created to manage the Hossein network’s fleet, managing 21 vessels at its peak for Hossein’s network, including both containerships and crude oil tankers. Switzerland-based Progwin Shipping SA (Progwin Shipping), formerly known as Fractal Shipping SA and managed by French and UK national Mathieu Alain Michel Philippe (Philippe), has drawn public attention for the unusual speed at which it assembled an expansive fleet of aging tankers, and for Progwin Shipping and Philippe’s willingness to exploit the high rates of return in shipping Russian oil, all for the benefit of Hossein’s network. In early 2024, following Progwin Shipping’s public exposure, UAE-based BPT Shipping Co L.L.C and Türkiye-based Westanker Denizcilik Ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Westanker Denizcilik) took over management of a group of vessels formerly managed by Progwin Shipping, helping Hossein’s network obfuscate the true ownership of its fleet. Westanker Denizcilik managed its new vessels in part through Marshall Islands-registered Westanker Limited. UAE-based entities The Zulu Ships Management and Operation - Sole Proprietorship L.L.C (Zulu Ships), Wanta Shipping L.L.C-FZ, and Algae Ship Charter - FZCO (Algae Ship) are among the many shipping companies in Hossein’s network that regularly shuffle in and out of management and operator roles for the network’s fleet. Zulu Ships manages ten vessels, while Algae Ship operates three vessels contained in the network’s fleet (see the Annex for full vessel list). UAE-based G M C G Shipping L.L.C and Cyprus-based GMCG Ltd. have incorporated and paid fees for front companies used by Hossein’s network, including Marshall Islands-based Neo Shipping Inc. UAE-based International Shipping Bureau L.L.C has also incorporated several companies that operate within the Hossein network. UAE-based Thamoud Mohammed Muhsin al-Azzawi is the managing director of G M C G Shipping L.L.C. Panama-based Hector Varela de Leon founded Panama-based GMCG Holding Corp and currently serves as its director. Mohamed Rafeek Habibullah Habibullah (Habibullah) and Hector Varela de Leon previously served as executives of a likely front company that once managed the FENG TAI, which in 2024 was sanctioned for transporting oil loaded in Iran on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). Habibullah also collected payments related to Sepehr Energy shipments of Iranian oil. In 2024, Hossein’s network purchased Russian oil in a transaction involving UAE-based Cober FZCO DMCC for resale to overseas buyers. Teodor Shipping L.L.C is a UAE-based vessel management firm that has received millions of dollars from Hossein’s network for management of vessels transporting Iranian petroleum and petroleum products. Marshall Islands-based shipping company Cora Lines Inc. is a subsidiary of Teodor Shipping L.L.C. UAE-based Indian national Pankaj Nagjibhai Patel (Patel) has served as an executive on several shipping companies in Hossein’s network, including Teodor Shipping L.L.C. Patel is also the director of India-based Shreeji Gems Ltd. Hossein Shamkhani, Weser Shipping Inc., Mohamed Rafeek Habibullah Habibullah, and Hector Varela de Leon are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy. TRIS GAS is being identified as property in which Weser Shipping Inc. has an interest.

US

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0215

2025-07-30

US

Executive Order 13902 of January 10, 2020 Imposing Sanctions With Respect to Additional Sectors of Iran

OFAC country specific

Iran

Blocking Property, Suspending Entry, Trade sanctions

• https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/topic/1551

E.O. 13902 imposes sanctions with respect to any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to operate in the construction, mining, manufacturing, and textiles sectors of the Iranian economy, and any additional sectors of the Iranian economy as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State. On October 8, 2020, the Secretary of the Treasury identified the financial sector of the Iranian economy for additional sanctions under E.O. 13902. Iranian and non-Iranian persons operating in these sectors could be subject to sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13902.

SDN