1976-08-21

Ivan Osipov is an FSB operative in the Criminalistics Institute - Military Unit 34435. Evidence including phone and travel records suggest that Ivan Osipov was one of the operatives involved in the use of a chemical weapon in the attempted assassination of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny during his August 2020 visit to Siberia. A chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. Osipov was an operative of the Criminalistics Unit present in Tomsk where Navalny was poisoned. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. There are reasonable grounds to suspect that Ivan Osipov, in his capacity as an operative in the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, was present in Tomsk at the time of the poisoning and was one of the key operatives responsible for the preparation and use of a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny.

The Director Disqualification Sanction was imposed on 09/04/2025.

2021-08-20

UK

The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

UK horizontal

Chemical Weapons

Asset freeze and making available provisions, Travel bans

• The Regulations impose financial sanctions through a targeted asset freeze on designated persons and prohibitions on making funds or economic resources available. This involves the freezing of funds and economic resources (non-monetary assets, such as property or vehicles) of designated persons and ensuring that funds and economic resources are not made available to or for the benefit of designated persons, either directly or indirectly. • The effect of the Regulations is to impose a travel ban on persons who are designated by the Secretary of State for the purposes of being made subject to immigration sanctions under the Sanctions Act.

The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 came fully into force on 31 December 2020. They put in place measures to ensure the UK can operate an effective sanctions regime in relation to the use and proliferation of chemical weapons. This sanctions regime is aimed at deterring the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. This includes encouraging the effective implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (“the Chemical Weapons Convention”). You should also review the Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 2) Regulations 2020 and the Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Regulations 2020 to find out any amendments made to the Regulations. These regulations have replaced, with substantially the same effect, relevant existing EU legislation and related UK regulations.

Licensing and exception provisions are contained in Part 5 of the Regulations.