Iran

1957

Iraq

Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating Iraj Masjedi, a general in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Iran’s Ambassador to Iraq, for acting for or on behalf of the IRGC-QF. A close adviser to former IRGC-QF Commander Qassem Soleimani, Masjedi played a formative role in the IRGC-QF’s Iraq policy. In his decades of service with the group, Masjedi has overseen a program of training and support to Iraqi militia groups, and he has directed or supported groups that are responsible for attacks that have killed and wounded U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. In his current capacity, Masjedi has exploited his position as the Iranian regime’s ambassador in Iraq to obfuscate financial transfers conducted for the benefit of the IRGC-QF. Masjedi is being designated pursuant to the counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF.  Iran’s ambassador to Iraq since 2017, Masjedi has publicly admitted the IRGC-QF’s role in special operations and the training of militia groups in Iraq, Syria, and beyond. He claims credit for organizing and supporting regional militias to advance Iran’s interests throughout the Middle East an enterprise that has spawned untold destruction and corruption, robbing Iraq of a stable, prosperous future. Masjedi has facilitated financial transfers for the benefit of the IRGC-QF in coordination with IRGC-QF financial facilitator Hushang Allahdad, acting at the direction of former IRGC-QF Commander Soleimani and his successor, Esma’il Ghani. Soleimani was designated pursuant to multiple authorities, including E.O. 13224, in 2011, while Allahdad and Ghani were designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 in 2010 and 2012, respectively. Since 2018, Masjedi has helped the IRGC-QF obtain foreign currency in Iraq, in return for equivalent sums that the IRGC-QF in Iran has transferred to relevant entities. Most recently, Masjedi has provided direct assistance in obtaining tens of billions of dinars on behalf of the IRGC-QF in Iraq. In the decades prior to his ambassadorial appointment, Masjedi was a senior figure overseeing IRGC-QF activities in Iraq, which included attacks targeting U.S. and coalition personnel, as well as kidnappings and the assassination of Iraqi provincial officials who sought to curb Iranian influence in Iraq. The IRGC-QF provided training for Iraqi recruits, often inside Iran. The Iraqi recruits hailed from groups loyal to, and supported by, the IRGC-QF, which help maintain Iranian influence in Iraqi politics and security. The IRGC-QF also manufactured and distributed weapons, including explosively formed penetrators, that killed and wounded hundreds during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Masjedi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1159

2020-10-22

US

Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594

OFAC-horizontal

Terrorism

Blocking Property

• https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/topic/2396

On June 6, 2003, OFAC issued the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (68 FR 34196, June 6, 2003 (“the Regulations”), to implement Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 of September 23, 2001, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism” (66 FR 49079, September 25, 2001). OFAC has amended the Regulations on several occasions. On September 9, 2019, the President, invoking the authority of, inter alia, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701–1706) (IEEPA) and the United Nations Participation Act (22 U.S.C. 287c) (UNPA), issued E.O. 13886, “Modernizing Sanctions To Combat Terrorism” (84 FR 48041, September 12, 2019), effective September 10, 2019. In E.O. 13886, the President, finding it necessary to consolidate and enhance sanctions to combat acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism by foreign terrorists, terminated the national emergency declared in E.O. 12947 of January 23, 1995, “Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process” (60 FR 5079, January 25, 1995), and revoked E.O. 12947, as amended by E.O. 13099 of August 20, 1998, “Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process” (63 FR 45167, August 25, 1998). In addition, the President amended E.O. 13224, in order to build upon initial steps taken in E.O. 12947, to further strengthen and consolidate sanctions to combat the continuing threat posed by international terrorism, and in order to take additional steps to deal with the national emergency declared in E.O. 13224, with respect to the continuing and immediate threat of grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists, which include acts of terrorism that threaten the Middle East peace process. Section 1 of E.O. 13886 replaces in its entirety section 1 of E.O. 13224, which had been amended by a number of prior Executive orders (E.O. 13224, as amended by all such authorities, is referred to herein as “amended E.O. 13224”), but does not amend the Annex to E.O. 13224, which was previously amended by E.O. 13268 of July 2, 2002, “Termination of Emergency With Respect to the Taliban and Amendment of Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001” (67 FR 44751, July 3, 2002) (“amended Annex to E.O. 13224”).

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