Russia; Russia

Pr-Kt Prosveshcheniya D. 99, Lit. A, Pomeshch., 180N Office 1, Saint Petersburg, 195299, Russia

1177847049049, Registration Number; 7840062534, Tax ID No.

According to the allegations in SDNY’s complaint, Petrov is a Russian national who has resided in Russia and Cyprus and works for Obshchestvo S Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennostyu Elektrokom VPK (Elektrokom), a Russia-based supplier of critical electronics components for manufacturers supplying weaponry and other equipment to the Russian military. Petrov and two co-conspirators operated an illicit procurement network in Russia and elsewhere overseas. They have fraudulently procured from U.S. distributors large quantities of microelectronics subject to U.S. export controls on behalf of Elektrokom. To carry out the scheme, Petrov and his co-conspirators used shell companies and other deceptive means to conceal that the electronics components were destined for Russia. The technology that Petrov and his co-conspirators has procured in contravention of export controls during the course of the conspiracy has significant military applications and includes various types of electronics components that have been recovered in Russian military hardware on the battlefield in Ukraine, such as Russian guided missiles, drones, and electronic warfare and communications devices. According to the allegations in SDNY’s complaint, to perpetrate the scheme, Petrov first acquired the controlled microelectronics from U.S.-based electronics exporters using a Cyprus-based shell company, Astrafteros Technokosmos LTD (Astrafteros), which he operates. Petrov procured these sensitive electronics components by falsely representing to the U.S. exporters that Astrafteros was purchasing the items for fire security systems, among other commercial uses, and that the ultimate end-users and destinations of the electronics were companies in Cyprus or other third countries—when in fact the components were destined for Elektrokom. Petrov, Elektrokom, and Astrafteros were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1871

2023-11-02

US

Executive Order 14024 of April 15, 2021 Blocking Property With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation

OFAC country specific

Russia

Blocking Property, Suspending Entry, Trade sanctions

• https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1127 • https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1029

In response to the Russian Federation’s continued use of its military-industrial base to support its aggression against Ukraine, the President has issued an Executive Order (E.O.) amending E.O. 14024 that provides the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) with new authorities to target foreign financial institutions for engaging in certain transactions. Foreign financial institutions that conduct or facilitate significant transactions or provide any service involving Russia’s military-industrial base run the risk of being sanctioned by OFAC. The United States and partners have put in place a sanctions and export controls regime that has severely restricted Russia’s ability to import many of the items that directly support its brutal and unjustified war against Ukraine. As a result, Russia is increasingly using third countries to evade sanctions and continue its procurement of certain critical items. The United States and partners have published multiple advisories, including detailed red flags, to warn the private sector about Russian sanctions evasion in support of its war machine and to support compliance efforts. OFAC’s new targeting authorities, which are aimed at foreign financial institutions that provide services to, or engage in significant transactions relating to, Russia’s military-industrial base, come as a natural evolution of OFAC’s work to counter evasion and hold accountable those perpetuating Russia’s war against Ukraine, including financial facilitators. OFAC is issuing this advisory to provide guidance to foreign financial institutions on the amendments to E.O. 14024, including practical guidance on how to identify sanctions risks and implement corresponding controls. For additional guidance on this E.O., please see FAQs 1146–1157.

SDN / NS-MBS / CAPTA