Last Updated: April 20, 2026
Last Updated: April 20, 2026
Naveed QAMAR
Aliases
Naved QAMAR
Navid QAMAR
Naveed Qamar KHAN
Nuwayd QAMAR
Nationality
Pakistan
DoB
1971-10-27
Address
Flat #R9, Nauman Grand Sati, Gulistan Johar, Block 17, Karachi Sharqi, Karachi Province, Sindh, Pakistan
Reg. ID
4220149109527, National ID No.; 35171469484, National ID No.; ZG4109521, Passport
Official reason
Specifically, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated James Alexander McLintock, Al-Rahmah Welfare Organization, Abdul Aziz Nuristani, the Jamia Asariya Madrassa, Naveed Qamar, and Muhammad Ijaz Safarash, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism. ABOUT TREASURY POLICY ISSUES DATA SERVICES NEWS SEARCH BREADCRUMB HOME NEWS PRESS RELEASES NEWS Press Releases Statements & Remarks Readouts Testimonies Featured Stories Webcasts Press Contacts PRESS RELEASES United States and Saudi Arabia Designate Terrorist Fundraising and Support Networks March 31, 2016 (Archived Content) Action Targets Six Individuals and Entities for Terrorism Fundraising Supporting al-Qaida, the Taliban, and/or Lashkar-e-Tayyiba WASHINGTON – The United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia today jointly took action to disrupt the fundraising and support networks of al-Qaida, the Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) by imposing sanctions on four individuals and two organizations with ties across Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Specifically, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated James Alexander McLintock, Al-Rahmah Welfare Organization, Abdul Aziz Nuristani, the Jamia Asariya Madrassa, Naveed Qamar, and Muhammad Ijaz Safarash, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism. As a result of today’s action, any property or interest in property of these designated individuals and entities subject to U.S. jurisdiction is frozen. Additionally, transactions by U.S. persons involving these parties are generally prohibited. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia designated these individuals and entities under its Law of Terrorism Crimes and Financing and the Royal Decree A/44. “From terrorizing local populations to exploiting charities and religious institutions, al-Qaida, the Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba have a long history of inflicting violence on Americans and our allies throughout South Asia and the Middle East,” said Adam J. Szubin, Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “Today’s action marks yet another step in Treasury’s efforts to financially cripple terrorist financiers and demonstrates the United States’ and Saudi Arabia’s shared resolve to target those who support terrorism.” James Alexander McLintock and Al-Rahmah Welfare Organization James Alexander McLintock was designated today pursuant to E.O. 13224 for providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial and other services to or in support of, al-Qaida, the Taliban, and LT. Al-Rahmah Welfare Organization (RWO) was also designated today pursuant to E.O. 13224 for being controlled by James Alexander McLintock. James Alexander McLintock is the president, CEO, and chairman of the Pakistan-based RWO—a front organization for al-Qaida that has been used to finance al-Qaida, the Taliban, LT, and other Afghan extremist groups. Outside of RWO, James McLintock has also personally supported multiple terrorist groups. RWO has provided funding to extremists for jihad under the false guise of helping orphans. As of early 2013, McLintock recruited Afghan insurgents to obtain photos of children, Afghan identity documents, and cell phone numbers to create falsified dossiers used to obtain donations for RWO, which were funneled to support al-Qaida. As early as 2010, McLintock used RWO and the cover of providing stipends to Afghan orphans to finance the Taliban’s militant activities in Kunar Province, Afghanistan. McLintock has previously provided funding to U.S.- and UN-designated al-Qaida and Taliban facilitator Fazeel-A-Tul Shaykh Abu Mohammed Ameen Al-Peshawari, also known as Shaykh Aminullah. Aminullah is the head of the Ganj Madrassa, which was designated by the U.S. pursuant to E.O. 13224 on August 20, 2013 for being controlled by Aminullah and for providing financial and material support to the Taliban and LT. Treasury assesses that some of the money McLintock gave to Aminullah probably was used for the activities of al-Qaida, the Taliban, and LT. Also in 2013, McLintock regularly met with Taliban and other militant commanders for the purpose of financing their attacks against Afghan government targets in Kunar Province. During this same period McLintock also financed Taliban militants in Afghanistan and prepared madrassa students for travel to fight in Afghanistan. Since May 2012, McLintock has provided support to the Taliban by using RWO and his other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to receive large amounts of money from British donors who were not aware of the NGOs’ Taliban ties. According to publicly available information, between April 2011 and April 2012 RWO received the equivalent of approximately $180,000 from donors in the United Kingdom. RWO has also received financial support from charities in the Persian Gulf and the United Kingdom. For several years, McLintock has been providing financial support to LT through other charities that he controlled in Pakistan and other countries. As of June 2013, McLintock, with the help of a smuggler in Kunar Province who was considered a deputy LT commander, smuggled cash to insurgents in Afghanistan and transferred materials for the construction of improvised explosive devices between Pakistan and Afghanistan. McLintock also used RWO as a front for both financing the activities of Afghan Salafist insurgents and helping to train them in the manufacturing of improvised explosive devices. Abdul Aziz Nuristani and Jamia Asariya Madrassa Abdul Aziz Nuristani was designated today pursuant to E.O. 13224 for providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial and other services to or in support of, al-Qaida, the Taliban, and LT. Jamia Asariya Madrassa was also designated today pursuant to E.O. 13224 for being controlled by Abdul Aziz Nuristani and for providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial and other services to or in support of, LT. Abdul Aziz Nuristani has led the Peshawar, Pakistan-based Jamia Asariya for over two decades and has provided support to multiple terrorist groups. For several years, organizations including LT and U.S.- and UN-designated Al-Akhtar Trust have used Jamia Asariya as a financial conduit to bring money into Pakistan. Nuristani has traveled to Gulf countries to raise money for both Jamia Asariya and Al-Turaz Trust, which is an alias for Al-Furqan Foundation Welfare Trust—also designated by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia on April 7, 2015. Jamia Asariya distributed thousands of dollars in supplies to LT camps in Pakistan. Individuals affiliated with the Jamia Asariya have also facilitated the provision of housing in Peshawar for Arab fighters with ties to al-Qaida. Nuristani has also personally supported LT for several years, and his affiliation with the group dates back to at least 2007. Nuristani was previously an LT official in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. As of early 2012, LT selected him to oversee activities in Nuristan and Konar Provinces, Afghanistan. As of late 2010, Nuristani recruited madrassa students to become LT fighters. Nuristani has also been identified as a Taliban figure as of mid-2010 and at one time funded the operations of a Taliban commander in Nuristan Province. He has provided funding and support for the Taliban, which has recruited fighters from Nuristani’s Jamia Asariya Madrassa in Peshawar. Nuristani has also served as a conduit of funds to al-Qaida militants. Nuristani has had a long association with designated Shaykh Aminullah and was responsible for operations in Nuristan. Naveed Qamar Naveed Qamar was designated today pursuant to E.O. 13224 for acting for or on behalf of LT. Naveed Qamar has held multiple influential positions of authority within LT and has supported LT’s fundraising activities since at least 2004. As of January 2015, Qamar was identified as a leader of LT. In addition to running an LT training camp and supervising LT’s Karachi sector commanders in 2011, Qamar’s key leadership positions include serving as the head of LT’s Education Department between 2013 and at least mid-2014; acting coordinator of LT for Sindh Province, Pakistan as of late 2008; chief of LT’s student wing and editor of the its “Al Dawa” magazine; and director as of 2003 for LT’s periodical department. Qamar has also been active in U.S.- and UN-designated LT charitable front Jamaat-ud Dawa (JUD) as of December 2015. JUD was added as an alias of LT pursuant to E.O. 13224 on April 28, 2006. In early 2013, Qamar led a group of Pakistani businessmen to an LT training camp for an orientation program on LT’s operations, after which they donated and pledged support of the group. As of early 2011, Qamar organized trips for businessmen to LT training camps to show how their funds were used. In 2010, Qamar also organized and attended meetings with businessmen from Karachi, Pakistan, in order to collect funds and appeal for donations for LT militant operations. In that same year, Qamar coordinated funds collected by senior members of Falah-e Insaniat Foundation (FIF) —a U.S.- and UN designated LT-affiliated NGO—while organizing logistics and funding for mujahidin attack planning against Indian targets. FIF was added as an alias of LT pursuant to E.O. 13224 on November 24, 2010. Additionally, Qamar has held bank accounts used by LT leadership to receive donations and financial assistance.
Other Information
Date of listing
2016-03-31
Program information
Authority
US
Program
Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594
Regime
OFAC-horizontal
Target State
Terrorism
Measures
Blocking Property
Sanctions Portfolio
Official Information
On June 6, 2003, OFAC issued the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (68 FR 34196, June 6, 2003 (“the Regulations”), to implement Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 of September 23, 2001, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism” (66 FR 49079, September 25, 2001). OFAC has amended the Regulations on several occasions. On September 9, 2019, the President, invoking the authority of, inter alia, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701–1706) (IEEPA) and the United Nations Participation Act (22 U.S.C. 287c) (UNPA), issued E.O. 13886, “Modernizing Sanctions To Combat Terrorism” (84 FR 48041, September 12, 2019), effective September 10, 2019. In E.O. 13886, the President, finding it necessary to consolidate and enhance sanctions to combat acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism by foreign terrorists, terminated the national emergency declared in E.O. 12947 of January 23, 1995, “Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process” (60 FR 5079, January 25, 1995), and revoked E.O. 12947, as amended by E.O. 13099 of August 20, 1998, “Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process” (63 FR 45167, August 25, 1998). In addition, the President amended E.O. 13224, in order to build upon initial steps taken in E.O. 12947, to further strengthen and consolidate sanctions to combat the continuing threat posed by international terrorism, and in order to take additional steps to deal with the national emergency declared in E.O. 13224, with respect to the continuing and immediate threat of grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists, which include acts of terrorism that threaten the Middle East peace process. Section 1 of E.O. 13886 replaces in its entirety section 1 of E.O. 13224, which had been amended by a number of prior Executive orders (E.O. 13224, as amended by all such authorities, is referred to herein as “amended E.O. 13224”), but does not amend the Annex to E.O. 13224, which was previously amended by E.O. 13268 of July 2, 2002, “Termination of Emergency With Respect to the Taliban and Amendment of Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001” (67 FR 44751, July 3, 2002) (“amended Annex to E.O. 13224”).
Additional Details
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