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Individual

Last Updated: April 19, 2026

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Last Updated: April 19, 2026

Individual

Stanislav Valentinovich Makshakov

DoB

1966

Official reason

Stanislav Makshakov is a deputy director in the FSB's Criminalistics Institute - Military Unit 34435. There are reasonable grounds to suspect that the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation was involved in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny using a toxic nerve agent. Evidence including phone records suggest that Stanislav Makshakov was the commander of the team of operatives involved in the use of chemical weapon in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. As Deputy Director he is responsible for and/or engaged in, provided support for or promoted the activities conducted by this unit in the FSB. Alternatively, he is associated with those who did. This designation is part of a package of designations targeting the FSB team involved. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020, were closely monitored by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack.

Other Information

The Director Disqualification Sanction was imposed on 09/04/2025.

Date of listing

2021-08-20

Program information
Program information
Authority

UK

Program

The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Regime

UK horizontal

Target State

Chemical Weapons

Measures

Asset freeze and making available provisions, Travel bans

Sanctions Portfolio

• The Regulations impose financial sanctions through a targeted asset freeze on designated persons and prohibitions on making funds or economic resources available. This involves the freezing of funds and economic resources (non-monetary assets, such as property or vehicles) of designated persons and ensuring that funds and economic resources are not made available to or for the benefit of designated persons, either directly or indirectly. • The effect of the Regulations is to impose a travel ban on persons who are designated by the Secretary of State for the purposes of being made subject to immigration sanctions under the Sanctions Act.

Official Information

The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 came fully into force on 31 December 2020. They put in place measures to ensure the UK can operate an effective sanctions regime in relation to the use and proliferation of chemical weapons. This sanctions regime is aimed at deterring the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. This includes encouraging the effective implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (“the Chemical Weapons Convention”). You should also review the Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 2) Regulations 2020 and the Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Regulations 2020 to find out any amendments made to the Regulations. These regulations have replaced, with substantially the same effect, relevant existing EU legislation and related UK regulations.

Additional Details

Licensing and exception provisions are contained in Part 5 of the Regulations.

Program URL
  • https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/618

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