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Individual

Last Updated: April 19, 2026

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Last Updated: April 19, 2026

Individual

Ahmed Hasan Ali Sulaiman MATAAN

Aliases

Ahmad Matan Hassan Ali SULAIMAN

MATAAN, Ahmed

MATAAN, Ahmad

Nationality

Yemen

DoB

1966

Address

Al Mahrah, Yemen

Official reason

Mohamed Hussein Salad (Salad), Ahmed Hasan Ali Sulaiman Mataan (Mataan), and Mohamed Ali Badaas (Badaas) are part of an al-Shabaab smuggling and weapons trafficking network in Yemen. The network members have served as representatives for terrorists, criminals, and weapons dealers from Somalia, some of whom were middlemen. As of early 2018, Salad received payment for a shipment of weapons for al-Shabaab that included 15 PK machine guns, about 80 AK-47s, and nearly a dozen boxes of grenades, ammunition, and military uniforms used by the Somali security forces. Al-Shabaab intended to use the uniforms to confuse people and facilitate entry into guarded installations. Mataan was the owner of the vessel used for the shipment. Between 2017 and 2020, Mataan owned dhows — sailboats used for regional trade and capable of carrying heavy loads — that took supplies for al-Shabaab militants to Somalia. In 2017, Mataan and al-Shabaab reached an agreement to transport weapons, improvised explosive device (IED) equipment, and ammunition and small arms to Somalia. Mataan’s dhows were involved in transporting IED components to al-Shabaab that were used to make explosive devices used in the Soobe bomb attacks on October14, 2017, that claimed close to 400 lives and wounded hundreds. Mataan was a Somali businessman who primarily profited from trafficking weapons and facilitating criminal groups. Mataan operated a fleet of more than half a dozen boats and a single shipment paid approximately $15,000. As of late 2021, al-Shabaab placed an order with Mataan for weapons and IED materials from Yemen. Mataan procured the weapons from a Yemeni weapons dealer and, in preparation for the shipment, a boat owned by Mataan arrived in Somalia to carry illegal seafood, including fish and lobster, to Yemen. As of early 2022, a dhow owned by Mataan departed Yemen with a shipment of weapons intended for al-Shabaab members in central Somalia. Salad was involved with facilitating the weapons shipment to Somalia. Mataan and Salad were business partners who jointly owned a boat used in a shipment for al­Shabaab. The shipment carried weapons, including AK-47s and shoulder-fired missiles, ammunition, and food and military uniforms typically worn by the Somali military.

Other Information

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1028

Date of listing

2022-10-17

Program information
Program information
Authority

US

Program

Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594

Regime

OFAC-horizontal

Target State

Terrorism

Measures

Blocking Property

Sanctions Portfolio

• https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/topic/2396

Official Information

On June 6, 2003, OFAC issued the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (68 FR 34196, June 6, 2003 (“the Regulations”), to implement Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 of September 23, 2001, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism” (66 FR 49079, September 25, 2001). OFAC has amended the Regulations on several occasions. On September 9, 2019, the President, invoking the authority of, inter alia, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701–1706) (IEEPA) and the United Nations Participation Act (22 U.S.C. 287c) (UNPA), issued E.O. 13886, “Modernizing Sanctions To Combat Terrorism” (84 FR 48041, September 12, 2019), effective September 10, 2019. In E.O. 13886, the President, finding it necessary to consolidate and enhance sanctions to combat acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism by foreign terrorists, terminated the national emergency declared in E.O. 12947 of January 23, 1995, “Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process” (60 FR 5079, January 25, 1995), and revoked E.O. 12947, as amended by E.O. 13099 of August 20, 1998, “Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process” (63 FR 45167, August 25, 1998). In addition, the President amended E.O. 13224, in order to build upon initial steps taken in E.O. 12947, to further strengthen and consolidate sanctions to combat the continuing threat posed by international terrorism, and in order to take additional steps to deal with the national emergency declared in E.O. 13224, with respect to the continuing and immediate threat of grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists, which include acts of terrorism that threaten the Middle East peace process. Section 1 of E.O. 13886 replaces in its entirety section 1 of E.O. 13224, which had been amended by a number of prior Executive orders (E.O. 13224, as amended by all such authorities, is referred to herein as “amended E.O. 13224”), but does not amend the Annex to E.O. 13224, which was previously amended by E.O. 13268 of July 2, 2002, “Termination of Emergency With Respect to the Taliban and Amendment of Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001” (67 FR 44751, July 3, 2002) (“amended Annex to E.O. 13224”).

Additional Details

SDN

Program URL
  • https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/07/01/2022-13969/global-terrorism-sanctions-regulations

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