Yegor Sergeyevich Popov (Popov) is an FSB 2nd Service officer who served as Ionov’s primary handler. Popov frequently communicated with Ionov to gather information related to Ionov’s foreign malign influence activities in the United States and elsewhere. Popov also often communicated with Burlinova to relay information in intelligence reports regarding her activities.
Ionov directed more than six U.S. co-conspirators, including two individuals who ran as candidates in local U.S. elections, to provide detailed information regarding the activities of several political groups, which Ionov subsequently compiled into reports for Popov and other FSB 2nd Service officers. In the Summer and Fall of 2019, Ionov and Popov communicated about a local U.S. election and Ionov’s support of a candidate, who won in the primary contest.
From as early as 2015 through at least 2022, Popov worked with Burlinova and oversaw her activities on behalf of the FSB. In 2015, Popov assisted and provided guidance to Burlinova in her travels to the United States. Popov provided Burlinova a list of U.S. citizens and proposed possible approaches to interact with them. Burlinova provided Popov evaluations of how U.S. citizens responded to presentations, and who had had positive attitudes towards Russia and were prepared to continue to collaborate with her. In 2018, Burlinova informed Popov that two individuals she identified, who resided in Europe, were running for public office, and Burlinova boasted that these were the fruits of her labor and described the developments as soft power.
Popov reported to his FSB 2nd Service unit chief Aleksei Borisovich Sukhodolov (Sukhodolov). Sukhodolov also worked with Ionov to conduct foreign malign influence operations around the world, including in the United States, Ukraine, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. Ionov directed reporting to Sukhodolov and other FSB officials of detailed information regarding the activities of several U.S. political groups. Ionov also reported on his malign influence activities to Sukhodolov, including his consulting role in a U.S. local election.
In late 2021, Sukhodolov worked with other FSB officers and a Russia-based institution to draft and submit grant applications on behalf of several FSB co-optees and their organizations and enterprises, which included Ionov and Burlinova.
OFAC designated Popov and Sukhodolov pursuant to E.O. 14024 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation.
On April 18, 2023, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida indicted Popov and Sukhodolov for working on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation. Also on April 18, DOJ filed a criminal complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, charging Burlinova with conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. § 951 (acting as an agent of a foreign government) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States).
Executive Order 14024 of April 15, 2021 Blocking Property With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation
In response to the Russian Federation’s continued use of its military-industrial base to support its aggression against Ukraine, the President has issued an Executive Order (E.O.) amending E.O. 14024 that provides the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) with new authorities to target foreign financial institutions for engaging in certain transactions. Foreign financial institutions that conduct or facilitate significant transactions or provide any service involving Russia’s military-industrial base run the risk of being sanctioned by OFAC.
The United States and partners have put in place a sanctions and export controls regime that has severely restricted Russia’s ability to import many of the items that directly support its brutal and unjustified war against Ukraine. As a result, Russia is increasingly using third countries to evade sanctions and continue its procurement of certain critical items. The United States and partners have published multiple advisories, including detailed red flags, to warn the private sector about Russian sanctions evasion in support of its war machine and to support compliance efforts. OFAC’s new targeting authorities, which are aimed at foreign financial institutions that provide services to, or engage in significant transactions relating to, Russia’s military-industrial base, come as a natural evolution of OFAC’s work to counter evasion and hold accountable those perpetuating Russia’s war against Ukraine, including financial facilitators.
OFAC is issuing this advisory to provide guidance to foreign financial institutions on the amendments to E.O. 14024, including practical guidance on how to identify sanctions risks and implement corresponding controls. For additional guidance on this E.O., please see FAQs 1146–1157.
